Post-Quantum Cryptography
Quantum computers, when sufficiently powerful, will break the public-key cryptographic algorithms that underpin virtually all secure communications today — RSA, ECDSA, ECDH, and Diffie-Hellman. Migrating to quantum-resistant (post-quantum) cryptography is one of the most significant infrastructure changes the industry faces in the coming decade.
The threat from quantum computers
Harvest now, decrypt later (HNDL)
Nation-state adversaries are believed to be collecting encrypted traffic today with the intent to decrypt it once a cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC) is available. Data encrypted today with RSA-2048 or ECDH P-256 is at risk if:
- The data has long-term sensitivity (classified material, health records, trade secrets)
- A CRQC becomes available within the data's sensitivity lifetime
Action required now: Begin migrating data with long-term sensitivity, even before CRQC exists.
Shor's algorithm
Shor's algorithm, running on a CRQC, breaks:
- RSA (factoring) — used in TLS certificates, SSH, S/MIME
- ECDSA / ECDH (elliptic curve discrete log) — used in TLS 1.3, code signing, blockchain
- DH / DSA (discrete log) — older TLS cipher suites, SSH
Shor's algorithm does not break symmetric cryptography (AES) or hash functions (SHA-256), though Grover's algorithm halves their effective key length — AES-256 remains adequate.
NCSC migration timelines
The NCSC published migration timeline guidance in 2025/2026:
- By 2028 — identify and inventory all cryptographic dependencies
- By 2031 — migrate highest-risk and longest-lived data and systems
- By 2035 — complete migration for all systems
NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards
NIST finalised the first three PQC standards in 2024:
| Standard | Algorithm | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| FIPS 203 | ML-KEM (CRYSTALS-Kyber) | Key encapsulation / key exchange |
| FIPS 204 | ML-DSA (CRYSTALS-Dilithium) | Digital signatures |
| FIPS 205 | SLH-DSA (SPHINCS+) | Digital signatures (hash-based, conservative) |
A fourth standard, FIPS 206 (FN-DSA / FALCON), is expected imminently.
Algorithm selection guidance
- Key exchange / TLS: Use ML-KEM (Kyber) for key encapsulation; combine with ECDH P-256 in hybrid mode during transition
- Digital signatures: Use ML-DSA (Dilithium) for general signatures; SLH-DSA for conservative/high-assurance use cases
- Code signing / PKI: Begin planning CA migration to ML-DSA
Hybrid cryptography (transition approach)
During migration, combine classical and post-quantum algorithms:
TLS 1.3 + X25519Kyber768 (hybrid key exchange)
= ECDH X25519 (classical) + ML-KEM-768 (post-quantum)Hybrid mode ensures:
- Security against classical attackers (existing protection)
- Security against quantum attackers (new PQC)
- Forward compatibility — if either algorithm is later broken, the other still protects
Cloudflare, Google, and major browsers have implemented hybrid TLS since 2023.
Migration roadmap
Phase 1: Inventory (now)
- Catalogue all systems using RSA, ECDH, ECDSA, DH
- Prioritise by data sensitivity and system lifetime
- Identify cryptographic dependencies in: TLS certificates, SSH keys, code signing, VPN (IKE), S/MIME, PDF/document signing
Phase 2: Prioritise
- Highest priority: Long-lived sensitive data; PKI / CA infrastructure; government and defence systems
- High priority: TLS for internet-facing services; VPN / IPsec endpoints
- Medium priority: Internal systems; short-lived data
Phase 3: Migrate
- Update TLS libraries (OpenSSL 3.x, BoringSSL, AWS-LC) — most already support Kyber/ML-KEM
- Update certificate issuance (CA software migration to ML-DSA)
- Update SSH implementations (OpenSSH 9.0+ supports hybrid ECDH + Kyber)
- Update VPN/IKE configurations as vendor support arrives
Phase 4: Validate
- Cryptographic agility — design systems to swap algorithms without full re-architecture
- Audit tooling — confirm no legacy RSA/ECDH in use post-migration
Crypto-agility
Systems should be designed for cryptographic agility — the ability to update algorithms without rewriting the system:
- Abstract cryptographic operations behind interfaces
- Store algorithm identifiers alongside ciphertext
- Avoid hardcoding specific algorithms in application logic
Further reading
- NCSC PQC migration timelines — ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/pqc-migration-timelines
- NIST PQC project — csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography
- NIST FIPS 203, 204, 205
- ETSI Quantum Safe Cryptography working group
- Network Encryption